MARY
Coredemptrix Mediatrix Advocate
THEOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS
Towards a Papal Definition?
Book 2
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Mary Coredemptrix and Disputes Over Justification and Grace:
An Anglican View
by Dr. John Macquarrie
Professor John Macquarrie, Anglican Philosopher and Theologian,
has served as Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity and Canon of Christ
Church, Oxford. He is a distinguished author of numerous important
works on Philosophy, Theology and Mariology, and a contributor to
the Ecumenical Society of the Blessed Virgin Mary.
There have been times in the
history of Christianity when Christ himself has become such a divine,
exalted, numinous figure that the worshippers found him so distant
that they needed a new mediator or mediatrix closer to their
own humanity to fill the space that had opened between themselves
and the original mediator. No doubt this is something that should
never have happened, and the New Testament itself teaches clearly,
‘There is one God, and there is one mediator between God and men,
the man Christ Jesus’ (1 Tim. 2:5). Not only should it not have
happened, I think we can say that in fact it is not happening at
the present time, because for several generations theologians have
been stressing the humanity of Christ. The Christ of post-Enlightenment
theology is not a distant and exalted Christ in glory but more commonly
a Christ reduced to all-too-human proportions. So the need for a
mediatrix is not likely to be felt today with the intensity
that was sometimes known in the past.
However, the matter cannot be settled
by pointing to the dangers of exaggeration and abuse, or by appealing
to isolated texts of scripture such as the verse quoted above from
1 Timothy, or by the changing fashions in theology and spirituality,
or by the desire not to say anything that might offend one’s partners
in ecumenical dialogue. Unthinking enthusiasts may have elevated
Mary to a position of virtual equality with Christ, but this aberration
is not a necessary consequence of recognizing that there
may be a truth striving for expression in words like Mediatrix
and Coredemptrix. All responsible theologians would agree
that Mary’s co-redemptive role is subordinate and auxiliary to the
central role of Christ. But if she does have such a role, the more
clearly we understand it, the better. It is a matter for theological
investigation. And, like other doctrines concerning Mary, it is
not only saying something about her, but something more general
concerning the Church as a whole or even humanity as a whole. At
this point as at others, mariology impinges on anthropology.
The general question which, as it
seems to me, is raised by the specifically mariological question
about the co-redemptive role of the Virgin, is that of the human
role in any adequate theology of salvation. Is this human role purely
a passive one, or is it, as Vatican II asserted about Mary,
a role that is also active? This is where mariology threatens
to revive old controversies. With Martin Luther, the principle sola
gratia, ‘by grace alone,’ was fundamental. Although Pelagianism,
the view that the human being has in himself the resources to find
the path of salvation and to progress along it, has made great inroads
into all the churches in the past two hundred years, the principle
‘by grace alone’ has remained a shibboleth of orthodox Protestant
theology. It is prominent, for instance, in the work of Karl Barth.
On this view, fallen man is so disabled by sin that he is totally
unable to help himself. Grace alone can redeem him, and he can contribute
nothing.
In some forms of this teaching, it
is even believed that human beings can be saved without even knowing
that salvation is taking place. It has all taken place already through
the once-for-all redeeming work of Christ. It is a fact, whether
anyone recognizes it or not. Karl Barth speaks in this way, though
admittedly there are some ambiguities in what he says. But it is
his belief that from all eternity the whole human race has been
elected or predestined to salvation in Jesus Christ. This event
has taken place outside of humanity, without it and even against
it. He says also, ‘If the good shepherd (Jn. 10:11ff.) gives his
life for the sheep, he does so to save the life of the sheep, but
without any co-operation on their part.’ We may agree that the sheep
do not need to cooperate or to be aware that there is any danger—the
threat is an external one (perhaps a pack of wolves in the neighborhood)
and they need never know that these wolves had been around. But
though this may be true of sheep and an adequate account of how
sheep may be saved from physical dangers, it is not true of human
beings and is a woefully inadequate view of what is required for
human salvation. The salvation or redemption offered by Christianity
is not from some enemy ‘out there,’ but from the enemy within, namely,
sin. It is not a physical rescue that is required—that might not
demand any co-operation and the person rescued might not even be
conscious of what was going on—but salvation, in the Christian sense,
is very different. In this case, salvation has to be appropriated
inwardly by an act of penitence (turning) and faith on the part
of the person saved.
The whole question was argued thoroughly
a generation ago between Barth and Bultmann, but people have short
memories. Bultmann had laid stress in his writings on the ‘decision
of faith.’ This decision is also expressed by Bultmann as ‘making
Christ’s cross one’s own,’ that is to say, by taking up the cross
through an act of inward acceptance and appropriation. Barth strongly
denied this. For him, the redemption is a purely objective act,
already finished ‘outside of us, without us, even against us,’ to
recall his words already quoted and used by him in his polemic against
Bultmann. Redemption is not, in his view, to be considered as an
ongoing process in which we have some part, but as the once-for-all
act of God long before we were born—though it is hard to know whether
this act in the past is the death of Christ on Calvary or the eternal
predestinating decree of God in the very beginning. But it is all
complete already without us.
Now, if one conceded Barth’s point,
then I think one would have to say that he is indeed treating human
beings like sheep or cattle or even marionettes, not as the unique
beings that they are, spiritual beings made in the image of God
and entrusted with a measure of freedom and responsibility. This
fundamental human constitution remains, even though ravaged by sin.
Human beings are still human, not mere things or animals. If Barth
were correct in what he says on these matters, it would make nonsense
of the struggles of history, of the training and preparation of
Israel, of the very incarnation of the Word, of the redemptive mission
of the Church, of the preaching of the gospel and the ministration
of the sacraments. These events in time could have no real significance,
for everything has been settle in advance. Human beings, on such
a view, have no freedom and no responsibility. They are not beings
made in the image of God with some small share in the divine creativity
and rationality, they are things to be passively manipulated and
pushed around. Fortunately for us—or so we are assured—we are manipulated
by grace rather than by a malignant fate or blind chance, nevertheless,
we are manipulated. This seems to me a degradation of the concept
of humanity implicit in the biblical accounts of creation. Feuerbach’s
words about Luther remain, alas, true of much of the theology that
stems from him and from other leading Reformers: ‘The doctrine is
divine but inhuman, a hymn to God but a lampoon of man.’ It is understandable
that Feuerbach, Marx, Nietzsche and a whole galaxy of modern thinkers
came to believe that Christianity alienates them from a genuine
humanity.
I was careful to say that there are
ambiguities in what Barth says about salvation and the human beings’s
part (or lack of part) in it. Though salvation is, in his view,
an objective act accomplished by God, he does believe that it is
important for human beings to become aware of God’s redemptive work
and to appropriate it in their lives—he can even at one point introduce
the controversial word ‘synergism’ or ‘co-working,’ though he envisages
this as something which does not belong to redemption itself but
is subsequent to it. I do not think, however, that his occasional
modifications are sufficiently clear or that they are fully integrated
into his main argument. Certainly, he never concedes what is for
me a vital point—that from the very first moment when the divine
grace impinges on a human life, it needs for its fruition a response,
however feeble, of penitence and faith. Not for a moment is it being
suggested that the human being initiates the work—the initiative
belongs to God. But if it is merely outside of us, without us and
even against us, then nothing worthy to be called ‘salvation’ can
take place. There has got to be something corresponding to Mary’s
reported words to Gabriel: ‘Behold I am the handmaid of the Lord;
let it be to me according to your word’ (Lk. 1:38).
The questions to which we have come
are highly controversial, and yet they are so central to the place
and significance of Mary that we must pursue them further. Although
we are trying to see Mary as a reconciling influence for different
Christian traditions, it would be wrong to ignore the fact that
she also raises issues that have been divisive, for these must be
faced if any true reconciliation is ever to be achieved. In particular,
we must examine more carefully the conflict that arises from the
teaching about the moral and spiritual helplessness of human beings
and the doctrine of justification by grace alone to which that teaching
has given rise. There have been strenuous efforts in recent years
to bridge the gulf that opened at the Reformation on these matters—one
thinks, for instance, of Hans Küng's excellent early book,
Justification, in which he tried to show that the teaching
of the Council of Trent and that of Karl Barth on this question
are not so totally opposed each other as had been assumed: or to
the Anglican-Roman Catholic International Commission's document
on justification, which was another praiseworthy attempt to narrow
the gap between the opposing points of view. There have also been
important New Testament researches into the topics of faith, justification,
grace and works.
Luther himself believed that the doctrine
of sola gratia can be clearly derived from the New Testament,
especially from the writings of Paul which had become for him a
kind of canon within the canon. He was especially impressed by Paul's
account in Romans of his unavailing struggles to fulfill the law,
and likewise with Paul's strong opposition, expressed in Galatians,
to those Judaizing elements who wished to impose some residual elements
of the law of Moses on Gentile converts to Christianity. Luther
saw these oppositions in extreme terms: on the one side, a harshly
legalistic Judaism in which salvation was to be gained through good
works performed in obedience to the law, and on the other side,
Christianity as a religion of grace in which redemption has been
gained for us by the cross and salvation is offered to us as a free
gift, without regard to our merit or lack of merit. The recent work
of such New Testament scholars as W. D. Davies and E. P. Sanders
has called into question this simplistic but highly influential
exegesis inherited from Luther. Davies puts the point quite mildly
when he warns us that ‘it is possible to make too much of the contrast
between Pauline Christianity as a religion of liberty and Judaism
as a religion of obedience,’ and he expresses the opinion that ‘justification
by faith’ is not the dominant factor in Paul's thought.’ These remarks
have been greatly strengthened by the important studies of Sanders,
who shows that in the Palestinian Judaism of Paul's time there was
a stress on grace as well as works, and that Paul's own position
was not so very different from that of his Jewish teachers. Sanders
claims that ‘the Rabbis kept the indicative and the imperative (i.e.,
grace and works) well balanced and in the right order.’
Luther's exegesis of Romans was developed
by him into a polemic against the Roman Catholic church, which he
equated with legalistic Judaism and contrasted with the Reformation
religion of grace. But now that the New Testament basis of his contrast
between first-century Judaism and early Christianity has been placed
in doubt, his application of this model to the relation between
Roman Catholic and Protestant versions of Christianity must also
be doubtful. It is interesting to note that Barth, in spite of his
championship of grace versus good works, is careful to distance
himself from Luther's misuse of Galatians, still uncritically accepted
by many Protestant writers. Barth says:
Certainly in Galatians there were
and are many more things to be discovered than what Luther discovered
then. Certainly there was and is much more to be said of the Roman
church and Roman theology both then and since, than what the Reformers
said then within the schema of Galatians. We do not need to consider
ourselves bound either in the one respect or in the other by their
attitude.
In theology and probably in many other
subjects as well, highly one-sided solutions to problems are rarely
satisfactory. As far as our present problem is concerned, I believe
that in any adequate theology there must be a place both for divine
grace and for human effort, for divine initiative and for the human
acceptance and active response. When Sanders speaks of getting these
things in the right order and well balanced, I take him to mean
that God's grace comes first, and presumably it is grace that evokes
and enables the human response, but the priority of grace does not
for a moment render the human response superfluous, or suggest that
the person who is the recipient of grace is in any way delivered
from the imperative to bring forth ‘fruits worthy of repentance’
(Lk. 3:8). It is the combination of divine grace and human response
that is so admirably exemplified in Mary. She is ‘highly favoured’
of God (or ‘full of grace’ in the familiar Vulgate rendering), but
she is also, in words which I quoted from W. P. DuBose, the one
who ‘represents the highest reach, the focusing upwards, as it were,
of the world's susceptibility for God’. If we accept that the human
being has been created by God, endowed with freedom, and made responsible
for his or her own life, and even if we accept in addition that
there are limits to freedom and responsibility, and especially that
through the weakness of sin no human being can attain wholeness
of life through effort that is unaided by divine grace—even Kant
in spite of his insistence on autonomy conceded as much—yet we are
still bound to say that there must be some human contribution to
the work of redemption, even if it is no more than responsive and
never of equal weight with the grace of God.
While the champions of sola gratia
have concentrated their attention on some passages of scripture
and have probably interpreted even these in a one-sided way, there
are other passages, even in the writings of Paul, where the element
of co-operation in the work of salvation seems to be clearly recognized.
It is Paul who, after the magnificent hymn in praise of Christ's
redeeming work, in his letter to the Philippians, goes on immediately
to say to the Christian believers: ‘Work out your own salvation
with fear and trembling; for God is at work in you’ (Phil. 2:12).
The thought here seems clearly to be that God's work and man's work
go on side by side in the realization of salvation. In another epistle,
he writes: ‘Working together with him, then, we entreat you not
to accept the grace of God in vain’ (2 Cor. 6:1). A straightforward
interpretation of these words seems quite incompatible with any
rigorous doctrine of sola gratia. For what does it mean ‘to
accept the grace of God in vain’ but to fail to make any response
to this grace, to refrain from any answering work? The expression
‘working together with him,’ which has also been translated ‘as
co-workers with him,’ is in Greek synergountes, from which
we derive the English word ’synergism,’ cited at an earlier stage
in the discussion. This word ‘synergism’ is the usual theological
term for the point of view I have been commending, namely, that
human salvation is accomplished neither by man's own unaided efforts
nor by an act of God entirely outside of man, but by a synergism
or co-working, in which, of course, the initiative and weight lie
on the side of God, but the human contribution is also necessary
and cannot he left out of account.
Before we leave the New Testament
on these questions, let us call to mind in addition to the Pauline
material the letter of James. Luther was so unhappy with this letter
that he questioned whether it should ever have been included in
the canon of the New Testament. It seems inconsistent with Paul's
insistence that we are justified by faith, not by works, or perhaps
we should say, with Paul's view of these matters as interpreted
by Luther. But one could say that the apparent tension between James
and Paul should not be taken to mean that James should have been
excluded from the canon, but rather that the inclusion of his letter
is a much needed corrective to some of the more one-sided Pauline
pronouncements as they have been commonly understood. ‘What does
it profit, my brethren,’ asks James, ‘if a man says he has faith
but has not works? Can his faith save him? If a brother or sister
is ill-clad and in lack of daily food, and one of you say to them,
"Go in peace, be warmed and filled," without giving them the things
needed for the body, what does it profit? So faith, by itself, if
it has no works, is dead’ (Jas. 2:14-17). Or perhaps one should
say that faith, as decision, is itself the beginning of the work.
We have already noted how Luther contrasted
Jewish legalism with Christian freedom, and how he sought to find
a parallel contrast in the opposition between Roman Catholicism
and Protestantism. Calvin in the meantime developed a doctrine of
double predestination no less rigorous than that of Augustine. But
we do find a dissenting voice among the Reformers. Luther’s friend
and associate, Philip Melanchthon, was the principal theologian
of the Lutheran Reformation. It is often claimed that he taught
a doctrine of synergism, though some Lutherans have tried to play
down this side of his teaching. But others have accused him of betraying
the Lutheran cause and of subverting even the key doctrine of justification
by grace alone. The truth is that Melanchthon retained a strong
humanistic bias through the passionate controversial years following
the Reformation, and therefore he could never feel at ease with
doctrines which seemed to him to threaten such essential human characteristics
as rationality, freedom and responsibility. So he was obviously
unhappy with such notions as predestination and irresistible grace.
He could not accept that, as he put it, ‘God snatches you by some
violent rapture, so that you must believe, whether you will or not.’
Again, he protested that the Holy Spirit does not work on a human
being as on a statue, a piece of wood or a stone. The human will
has its part to play in redemption, as well as the Word of God and
the Spirit of God. Such teaching might seem to us to be just common
sense, but in the highly charged atmosphere of Melanchthon's time,
it needed courage to say such things, and it brought angry rejoinders
from other Lutherans. But Melanchthon shows that even at the heart
of Lutheran theology an effort was being made to find an acceptable
place for synergism or co-working between God and man in the work
of salvation.
Let us now come back to the consideration
of Mary as Coredemptrix. Perhaps we do have to acknowledge
that Barth and others have been correct in believing that the place
given to Mary in catholic theology is a threat to the doctrine of
sola gratia, but I think this is the case only when the doctrine
of sola gratia is interpreted in an extreme form, when this
doctrine itself becomes a threat to a genuinely personal and biblical
view of the human being as made in the image of God and destined
for God, a being still capable of responding to God and of serving
God in the work of building up the creation. This hopeful view of
the human race is personified and enshrined in Mary.
First, we have to consider Mary in
the context of the Church in which she is judged to he its preeminent
and paradigmatic member. Because Mary personifies and sums up in
herself the being of the Church, she also exhibits in an exemplary
way the redemptive role that belongs to the whole Church. In the
glimpses of Mary that we have in the gospels, her standing at the
cross beside her Son, and her prayers and intercessions with the
apostles, are particularly striking ways in which Mary shared and
supported the work of Christ—and even these are ways in which the
Church as a whole can have a share in co-redemption. But it is Mary
who has come to symbolize that perfect harmony between the divine
will and the human response, so that it is she who gives meaning
to the expression Coredemptrix.
But secondly, there is the further
context in which Mary has to be considered, the context of the incarnation
of the Word. In this context, the language of co-redemption is also
appropriate, but in a different way, for in this regard her contribution
was unique and by its very nature could not be literally shared
with anyone else. We are thinking of her now not just as representative
or pre-eminent member of the Church, but as Theotokos or
Mother of God. Mary's willing acceptance of her indispensable role
in that chain of events which constituted the incarnation and the
redemption which it brought about, was necessary for the nurture
of the Lord and for the creation of the Church itself. So Mary is
not only in the Church and of the Church, she is also prior to the
Church, as is implied in her title, Mother of the Church.